Self-referencing languages revisited

Gabor Redey, Attila Neumann
Self-referencing languages revisited
In Proceedings of the First Workshop on Philosophy and Informatics (WSPI 2004), pages 105-111. 2004.

Information

  • Publication Type: Conference Paper
  • Workgroup(s)/Project(s): not specified
  • Date: 2004
  • Booktitle: Proceedings of the First Workshop on Philosophy and Informatics (WSPI 2004)
  • Date (from): March 2004
  • Editor: Büchel, G, Klein, B
  • Location: Cologne
  • Pages (from): 105
  • Pages (to): 111
  • Keywords: Tarski paradox, Language of logic

Abstract

Paradoxes, particularly Tarski's liar paradox, represent an ongoing challenge have long attracted special interest. There have been numerous attempts to give either a formal or a more realistic resolution to this area based on natural logical intuition or common sense.

The present semantic analysis of the problem components concludes that the traditional language of logic fails to detect Tarski's paradox, since the formalised version of a liar sentence does not represent a correct definition. Neither the formal language, nor the logical system is deficient in this respect. Only natural language statements cannot be interpreted adequately by traditional language of logic.

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BibTeX

@inproceedings{Redey-2004-SRLR,
  title =      "Self-referencing languages revisited",
  author =     "Gabor Redey and Attila Neumann",
  year =       "2004",
  abstract =   "Paradoxes, particularly Tarski's liar paradox, represent an
               ongoing challenge have long attracted special interest.
               There have been numerous attempts to give either a formal or
               a more realistic resolution to this area based on natural
               logical intuition or common sense.   The present semantic
               analysis of the problem components concludes that the
               traditional language of logic fails to detect Tarski's
               paradox, since the formalised version of a liar sentence
               does not represent a correct definition. Neither the formal
               language, nor the logical system is deficient in this
               respect. Only natural language statements cannot be
               interpreted adequately by traditional language of logic. ",
  booktitle =  "Proceedings of the First Workshop on Philosophy and
               Informatics (WSPI 2004)",
  editor =     "B\"{u}chel, G, Klein, B",
  location =   "Cologne",
  pages =      "105--111",
  keywords =   "Tarski paradox, Language of logic",
  URL =        "/research/publications/2004/Redey-2004-SRLR/",
}